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The	EU’s	current	problems	are	largely	of	its	own
making
European	integration	used	to	be	a	jewel	in	the	liberal	crown.	Integration	was	not	only	seen	as	a
quintessential	liberal	project,	but	also	as	a	tool	for	spreading	liberal	values	in	Europe	and	beyond.
How	can	we	explain	the	dramatic	decline	in	support	for	the	Union?	In	an	extract	from	his	new
book,	Counter-Revolution,	Jan	Zielonka	(University	of	Oxford)	explores	some	of	the	reasons
why	disillusionment	set	in.
European	integration	was	inspired	by	several	key	liberal	propositions	shared	not	only	by	liberal,
but	also	by	Christian	democratic	and	social	democratic	parties	since	1945.	Liberals	always	believed	that	open
markets	are	the	best	means	of	generating	wealth	and	opportunities,	of	challenging	vested	interests,	and	of
expanding	people’s	freedom.	The	most	prominent	liberals,	such	as	John	Stuart	Mill,	even	held	that	trade	generates
peace	because	trade	requires	collaboration,	trust,	and	openness.	Trade	also	generates	economic	interdependence
or	even	mutual	vulnerability	which	liberals	see	as	positive	things	because	they	create	a	common	destiny	of	states
and	people.	Liberals	thought	that	common	laws	and	institutions	enhance	cooperation	and	help	to	settle	potential
conflicts.	A	certain	kind	of	central	authority	is	also	required	not	just	to	arrest	free	riding,	but	also	to	aggregate	power
and	steer	it	towards	collective	ends.	Not	all	liberals	were	nomads	(Immanuel	Kant	hardly	ever	left	Königsberg),	but
they	were	internationalists	fiercely	combating	pathologies	of	nationalism.
The	experience	of	two	horrible	wars	in	the	twentieth	century	reinforced	this	normative	thinking.	Security	based	on
walls,	deterrence,	and	balance	of	power	resulted	in	millions	of	deaths	and	economic	destruction.	The	absolute	notion
of	sovereignty	emphasising	national	economics	and	jurisdiction	seemed	at	odds	with	the	post-war	concept	of
modernity.	Economic	integration	and	transnational	regulation	was	seen	not	just	as	a	means	for	boosting	growth	and
prosperity,	but	also	for	diffusing	security	concerns.	The	Schuman	Declaration	of	1950	stated	that	the	European	Coal
and	Steel	Community,	a	forerunner	of	the	EU,	is	to	make	war	between	historic	rivals	‘not	merely	unthinkable,	but
materially	impossible’.
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There	is	no	point	in	speculating	what	post-war	Europe	would	have	been	like	without	the	EC/EU.	While	it	is	true	that
many	different	factors	have	contributed	to	peace	and	prosperity,	European	integration	was	certainly	one	of	them.
This	was	even	recognized	by	the	Tory	government	in	the	early	1970s	which	saw	joining	the	EC	as	a	means	of
enhancing	British	well-being.	The	June	1970	speech	of	Anthony	Barber,	a	UK	government	spokesman,	outlining	the
British	position	towards	the	common	market	unambiguously	declared:
LSE Brexit: The EU’s current problems are largely of its own making Page 1 of 3
	
	
Date originally posted: 2018-03-06
Permalink: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/2018/03/06/the-eus-current-problems-are-largely-of-its-own-making/
Blog homepage: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/
‘It	is	wholly	unrealistic	to	separate	the	political	and	economic	interests	of	Europe,	because	our	place	in	the
world,	and	our	influence,	will	be	largely	determined	by	the	growth	of	our	resources	and	the	pace	of	our
technological	development.	Economic	growth	and	technological	development	today	require	that	we
integrate	our	economies	and	our	markets.’
Archives	revealing	private	discussions	within	the	British	government	four	decades	ago	confirm	that	politicians	could
hardly	see	their	country	booming	while	remaining	outside	Europe’s	integrative	scheme.	This	is	history,	however,	at
least	as	far	as	British	Tories	are	concerned.
It	is	difficult	to	establish	when	things	started	to	go	wrong	in	Europe.	Specialists	in	economics	point	to	the	collapse	of
the	Bretton	Woods	system	and	the	subsequent	oil	crisis	that	slowed	down	Europe’s	impressive	economic	growth.
Specialists	in	geopolitics	point	to	the	fall	of	communism	in	Eastern	Europe	which	put	the	European	project	under
enormous	stress.	The	EU	has	enlarged	dramatically,	Germany	has	become	not	only	larger,	but	also	more	powerful,
and	new	neighbours	have	generated	instability	and	migration.	Specialists	in	EU	institutions	point	to	the	failure	of	the
European	Constitution	as	a	result	of	negative	referenda	in	the	Netherlands	and	France.	Major	reforms	of	the	EU
have	been	difficult	if	not	impossible	since.
Whatever	the	reasons	for	Europe’s	worsening	condition	the	last	decade	has	seen	the	EU	generating	opposite	effects
from	those	originally	intended.	The	EU’s	major	rationale	was	always	efficiency,	not	citizens’	participation.	Its	case
rested	on	the	modernist	notion	of	competence	and	progress	rather	than	traditional	notions	of	loyalty,	trust,	or
affection.	Nation-states,	unlike	the	EU,	had	their	mythical	long	history	and	democratic	mechanisms	connecting	them
with	citizens.	Yet,	they	were	too	small	and	weak	to	cope	with	global	commercial,	migratory,	or	security	pressures.
Because	of	its	impressive	size	and	scale	the	EU	was	able	to	accomplish	things	that	individual	states	were	not.	Would
any	European	state	be	able	to	impose	and	execute	a	mega	fine	of	$1.4bn	for	failure	to	comply	with	anti-competitive
business	practices	on	a	giant	such	as	Microsoft?	This	is	what	the	EU	has	actually	accomplished.
True,	European	decision-making	was	always	complex,	slow,	and	hostage	to	the	lowest	common	denominator,	but
this	has	not	prevented	the	EU	from	flexing	its	muscle	within	and	outside	its	borders.	Consider	the	skilful	way	of
stabilizing	Central	and	Eastern	Europe	after	the	fall	of	the	Soviet	system	through	the	policy	of	enlargement	under
strict	conditions.	Or	think	about	the	European	Commission	and	the	European	Court	of	Justice’s	impressive	capacity
to	enforce	application	of	the	acquis	communautaire	comprising	some	20,000	European	laws,	decisions,	and
regulations.	However,	today	the	European	institutions	look	paralysed	and	unable	to	make	progress	on	the	most
pressing	issues.	Individual	member	states	practice	cherry-picking	in	complying	with	European	norms	and	laws,	while
the	EU	Neighbourhood	Policy	amounts	to	empty	declarations.	After	three	successive	bailouts	and	numerous	EU
summits	hardly	anybody	believes	that	Greece	will	ever	pay	its	debts.	Nor	is	it	credible	to	claim	that	several	EU
summits	devoted	to	economic	migrants	and	political	refugees	have	found	a	durable,	let	alone	ethical,	solution	for
coping	with	them.	Russia	is	not	going	to	leave	Crimea,	despite	the	EU	sanctions.	The	EU	is	not	even	able	to	steer
global	trade	and	environmental	negotiations,	something	that	used	to	be	the	EU’s	speciality.
One	can	go	even	a	step	further	and	argue	that	most	of	the	problems	Europe	is	facing	at	present	have	been
generated	by	the	EU	itself.	This	is	because	the	Euro	was	designed	in	a	deficient	way,	and	so	was	the	Schengen
system.	I	am	not	even	talking	about	the	European	Common	Foreign	and	Security	Policy,	which	never	had	any
meaningful	diplomatic	and	military	means	at	its	disposal.	In	short,	the	EU	institutions	seem	no	longer	fit	for	purpose,
and	by	extension	they	are	inefficient,	undermining	the	basic	rationale	behind	the	EU’s	very	existence.
European	integration	was	also	supposed	to	create	the	most	competitive	economy	in	the	world.	It	was	supposed	to
make	the	‘Stockholm	consensus’	prevail	over	the	‘Washington	consensus’,	not	just	in	the	north,	but	also	in	the	east
and	south	of	Europe.	The	common	currency	and	the	single	market	were	the	key	means	for	achieving	these
ambitious	economic	aims.	For	a	long	time,	these	objectives	seemed	to	be	fulfilled	even	beyond	expectations.	The
EC/EU	generated	growth	by	enforcing	rules	of	economic	competition	and	by	abolishing	barriers	to	the	movement	of
capital,	goods,	services,	and	people	within	its	borders.	It	negotiated	external	trade	agreements	protecting	member
states	from	exporters	using	lower	labour	or	environmental	standards.	It	helped	weaker	economic	actors	(in	the
private	sector	such	as	the	farmers	and	in	the	public	sector	such	as	the	regions)	to	cope	with	economic	pressures.	It
opened	and	transformed	markets	of	neighbouring	countries	through	the	policy	of	conditional	accession	to	the	EU	or
through	various	forms	of	association.
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Growth	has	been	distributed	more	evenly	in	Europe	than	in	other	parts	of	the	world,	diffusing	industrial	conflicts	and
contributing	to	competitiveness.	Sweden,	Finland,	and	Denmark	with	their	high	levels	of	welfare	spending	and
environmental	regulation	score	as	well	as	the	United	States	on	the	Global	Competitiveness	Index.	The	economies	of
Germany,	Austria,	and	the	Netherlands	have	consistently	performed	well	despite	their	high	taxes	and	social	benefits.
The	Euro	initially	seemed	a	great	success	too,	sheltering	Europe	from	financial	volatility	and	lowering	costs	of
transactions.	Today,	the	common	currency	is	in	trouble	and	it	undermines	the	achievements	of	the	single	market.
Even	the	strongest	European	economies	struggle	to	generate	growth	and	Europe’s	welfare	systems	are	shrinking.
The	European	Commission	seems	more	eager	to	listen	to	30,000	lobbyists	in	Brussels	than	to	ordinary	citizens
across	the	continent.	The	Euro	was	meant	to	help	integrate	Europe,	but	it	achieved	the	opposite;	it	exacerbated	the
gaps	and	conflicts	between	the	surplus	and	deficit	countries,	the	importers	and	exporters,	and	the	north	and	south.
Last	but	not	least,	European	integration	was	supposed	to	get	rid	of	power	politics.	Large	and	rich	states	were	no
longer	to	bully	small	and	impoverished	ones.	Above	all,	Europe	was	not	to	be	ruled	by	Germany.	Today,	a	few	‘triple
A’	countries	run	Europe	with	Germany	in	the	driving	seat.	Gone	is	equality	among	member	states.	New	treaties	are
written	with	only	some	states	in	mind,	external	(arbitrary)	interference	in	domestic	affairs	abounds,	and	policies	are
chiefly	about	punishment	rather	than	assistance	and	incentives.
This	post	represents	the	views	of	the	author	and	not	those	of	the	Brexit	blog,	nor	the	LSE.	It	is	an	extract	from
Counter-Revolution:	Liberal	Europe	in	Retreat	(Oxford	University	Press,	2018).
Jan	Zielonka	is	Professor	of	European	Politics	and	Ralf	Dahrendorf	Fellow,	St	Antony’s	College,	University	of	Oxford.
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